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Introduction
Equality cases under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms1 are discussed mostly for 
the complexity of their equality dimensions and 
the corresponding jurisprudential challenges 
such nuances present litigator and judge alike. 
#e recent Charter equality challenge in Sagen 
v. VANOC2 — the women’s ski jumping case — 
presents a modi$cation to this theme. It was a 
tricky case for the challengers, but not because 
of the discrimination issue. Rather, the novelty 
of the state action problem in this case caused 
the ski jumpers the most trouble, and, formally, 
defeated their claim. Indeed, at both the British 
Columbia Supreme Court and the British Co-
lumbia Court of Appeal this state action issue 
befuddled the equality analysis itself. #e result 
is a case that has tremendous immediate popu-
lar power as an instance of sex discrimination 
but that nonetheless has no purchase under the 
Charter.
One might choose to discuss at length this 
doctrinal twist. A%er all, both court decisions 
add to the free-for-all that equality reasoning 
under section 15 has become. Delphic utter-
ances from the Supreme Court of Canada and 
lower court creativity have combined to render 
section 15 jurisprudence the ski cross of Charter 
litigation. #is comment will discuss some of 
the problematic turns the two decisions took in 
rejecting the claimants’ arguments about viola-
tion of the Charter’s equality provisions. How-
ever, the point of doing so is not to argue that 
there is another, doctrinally truer, course the 
courts should have taken, one that guarantees 
just, fair, and right results. Rather, the purpose 
is to demonstrate that application questions un-
der the Charter are condemned to jurispruden-
tially “uncomfortable” outcomes as a result of 
an indeterminacy at the base of bills of rights 
— such as the Charter — born of and nourished 
by liberal legalism. As law professors Hutchin-
son and Petter argue, “inevitably the founda-
tion collapses, like a false bottom, disclosing the 
political chasms beneath.”3
#e outcome in Sagen is, perhaps, not quite 
the disaster that the quote implies. #e women 
ski jumpers, while clearly facing gender dis-
crimination, are not the most indigent equality 
claimants one can imagine. Even excluded from 
jumping at the Olympics, they are not fording 
the Styx. #e case on its own immediate terms 
is less distressing than those of other defeated 
equality claimants — such as that of Louise Gos-
selin in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney-General),4 
where the ideological shaping that guided both 
the Quebec legislative regime and the majority 
judgment at the Supreme Court of Canada dis-
played deeply problematic (but popular) politi-
cal assumptions about young welfare recipients 
— assumptions that le% untroubled severe eco-
nomic deprivation. Nonetheless, sanctioned sex 
discrimination in a publicly funded exercise on 
the scale of the Olympics is no small issue. It 
reinforces and perpetuates a troubling but tra-
ditional discriminatory message about women, 
athletics, and social citizenship. (More about 
this later.) But even more remarkable is what the 
decisions say about the relevance of the Char-
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ter to government activities. A programme of 
activity successfully located as governmental 
under section 32 of the Charter can still evade 
Charter scrutiny as long as the element at issue 
in that programme simply follows directions is-
sued by some private actor. It is another turn of 
the screw: even governments can escape Char-
ter responsibilities. It becomes less and less clear 
just what progressive contribution the Charter 
makes to struggles for a just and fair society. Or, 
perhaps, it becomes more and more clear that 
the Charter is not of any great direct or special 
help to such endeavours.
!e “Inrun”5 to the Case
#e facts surrounding the ski jumping case 
have become part of the larger political fabric 
of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. Al-
ready contentious for its civil, economic, and 
environmental impacts, the Winter Olympics 
became notorious for the International Olym-
pics Committee’s (IOC) refusal to include 
women’s ski jumping as an event6 in the Olym-
pic games programme, and for the Vancouver 
Organizing Committee’s (VANOC) apparent 
acquiescence in this decision. Ski jumping has 
the dubious status of being the only sport in the 
Winter Olympics that is not open to both men 
and women.7 Men have jumped in the Olym-
pics since 1924. #ree men’s ski jumping events 
were scheduled for the 2010 Games.8 No women 
ski jumpers’ competitive events have ever been 
scheduled at any Olympics. 
A string of events led to the initiation of a 
constitutional challenge before the British Co-
lumbia courts. Women ski jumpers have argued 
for inclusion in the Winter Olympics for sev-
eral past Olympics. In May 2006, the Interna-
tional Ski Federation, the governing body for 
international skiing competitions, voted 114 -1 
to approve a request to the IOC that women’s 
ski jumping be added to the 2010 Games pro-
gramme. #e following November, VANOC, 
a%er receiving a request to do so from members 
of the Canadian Women’s Ski Jumping Team, 
sent a letter in support of inclusion to the IOC. 
Days later, however, the IOC Executive Board 
decided not to include women’s ski jumping 
in the Games. #e IOC claimed the ruling was 
based on “technical merit” and had nothing to 
do with gender discrimination.9 President of the 
IOC Jacques Rogge elaborated: “We do not want 
the medals to be diluted and watered down.”10 
At this point, by all appearances, VANOC qui-
etly accepted the IOC ruling and the exclusion. 
#e women ski jumpers did not. Four moth-
ers of female ski jumpers $led a discrimination 
complaint with the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission.11 #e complaint resulted in a me-
diated settlement which, it has been reported, 
required the federal government to press the 
IOC to include women’s ski jumping in the 2010 
Olympics.12 E'orts by Helena Guergis, federal 
Secretary of State for Sport, were unsuccessful. 
Faced with this outcome, on May 21, 2008 a 
group of nine elite women ski jumpers — from 
$ve countries including Canada — $led a Char-
ter challenge to their exclusion from the Olym-
pic Games.13 
A year and a half later, the case has failed: 
a rejection of the challenge by the British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court14 was con$rmed by the 
Court of Appeal15 and leave for a further appeal 
was denied by the Supreme Court of Canada.16
!e Jump: Argument at Each Level 
of Court
#e case raised two key doctrinal issues: 
does the Charter apply to VANOC and, if so, has 
VANOC unjusti$ably infringed the Charter’s 
equality rights by staging men’s ski jumping but 
not women’s ski jumping at the 2010 Olympics? 
And there was one critical fact: the IOC alone 
has control over the selection of events staged 
at the Games. #e results at both levels of court 
in British Columbia revolved around this fact, 
although its doctrinal signi$cance varied.
Application of the Charter
Jurisprudence on the application of the 
Charter is complex. It relies on a fundamen-
tal, but ultimately porous and indeterminate, 
distinction between government and non-gov-
ernment. #e result is that Supreme Court of 
Canada case law is a labyrinth of quali$cations 
and alternative lines of argument. Even the $rst 
decision on Charter application, RWDSU v. Dol-
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phin Delivery Ltd.,17 is contradictory—holding 
that the Charter both does and does not apply to 
the common law.18 Comment on this inconsis-
tency is not novel19 but it reminds us that, from 
the start, Charter application jurisprudence has 
been plagued by judicial insistence on a false 
positivism with consequent contradiction and 
confoundment.
#e reason for this is simple. #e Charter, 
like any other liberal rights protecting docu-
ment, has a central (but impossible) necessity: 
it must articulate a coherent boundary between 
the public and the private, between govern-
ment and non-government. And it must use 
this boundary to determine whether the Char-
ter applies. Protecting the individual from the 
powerful state is one thing. Indeed it is the 
ambition that animates liberalism: in classical 
liberal thought, the concentrated power of the 
state imperils the “heroic individual.” For many 
liberals, this core “anxiety” is addressed by the 
imposition of formal, legally imposed rights to 
maintain the ideologically mandated boundary 
between state power and individual liberty.20 
But requiring non-state actors to adhere to con-
stitutional virtues is something else. #is use of 
rights smacks of the very state coercion of in-
dividuals that liberalism fears: an attack on the 
moral autonomy of the individual.21 It tips rights 
protections on their liberal heads, changing 
them from markers of liberty to instruments of 
state control.22 #e application of rights to non-
state actors is thus contradictory within classi-
cal liberalism’s prism. Liberal rights documents 
must preserve a sphere of untouchable private 
action clear of obligatory constitutional norms 
and “state” virtues.23 And, this separation of the 
public sphere from the realm of private activ-
ity sets limits on the types of rights claims the 
courts recognize.24 
Section 32 of the Charter governs the reach 
of the Charter25 and has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to instantiate such a public/pri-
vate distinction. #is is done by way of the doc-
trine of vertical application and that doctrine’s 
reliance on the distinction between government 
and non-government. #us the Charter, we are 
told, applies only to government actors and ac-
tions. #is requires in any Charter application 
case some analytical inquiry into whether or 
not the state, as the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
interpretation of section 32 understands it, is 
involved.26 
Of course, it is impossible to draw a clear 
and predictable line between what is an exer-
cise of state power and what is not. #e state is 
so fully imbricated in all aspects of social and 
economic life, in both the retention of current 
distributions of resources and changes to that 
distribution, that convincing arguments can 
almost always be made that something both is 
and is not a product, somehow, of state action. 
Reliance on such a distinction ignores how the 
“public” and the “private” in)uence and rein-
force each other. While the distinction is an in-
teresting and sometimes useful abstraction, at-
tempts to use it to draw a line in the real world 
are “at best futile and at worst covertly ideologi-
cal.”27 #at is, while the line between the public 
and private is indeterminate, the articulation 
of it, in this instance by courts, is not apolitical 
but rather follows o%en clear ideological lines.28 
(Indeed, the line-drawing involved is always 
political — sometimes just more starkly so de-
pending on where the observer stands.) Still, the 
larger point is that Charter application jurispru-
dence is committed to a distinction that is ana-
lytically central but practically indeterminate. 
When judges, then, are asked to decide if an en-
tity or an action lies inside or outside the realm 
of Charter scrutiny, they are “engaged in po-
litical and partisan decision-making.”29 Liberal 
democratic theorists generally need not deny 
this — but certainly some (liberal) defenders of 
judicial review do.30 
#e result is case law that skates on thin ice 
— using fancy judicial footwork, and the oc-
casional leap, to distinguish past jurisprudence 
when new and compelling factual scenarios 
emerge. In this manner, at least two lines of 
argument for holding an entity or an activity 
accountable as government under the Charter 
have emerged from the Supreme Court. First, 
the Charter will apply if the entity in question 
is itself “government” for the purposes of sec-
tion 32. #is entails an examination of the na-
ture and degree of governmental control and re-
quires a $nding of routine, daily governmental 
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oversight of the entity.31 #e test is one of form, 
rather than function: are the markers of gov-
ernment control present? If the entity in ques-
tion or the action under issue is subject to the 
requisite degree of government control, then it 
will be deemed governmental for the purposes 
of Charter application. #e second line of argu-
ment holds that, even if the entity itself is not 
“governmental” in this $rst sense, the Charter 
will be held applicable to an otherwise private 
entity to the extent that the entity is carrying 
out a government policy or programme. #is 
second test’s ancestry lies in Eldridge v. Brit-
ish Columbia (Attorney General),32 a judgment 
where the Supreme Court of Canada, faced with 
sympathetic rights claimants, had to $nd a way 
around its previous holding that hospitals were 
private (not governmental) entities and thus 
immune from Charter oversight.33 #e Court’s 
solution in that case was to generate a second 
line of argument for Charter applicability — 
one that looked to the activity not the entity.34
#e ski jumpers, at least at the trial court, 
argued that VANOC was subject to the Charter 
along both lines of argument. VANOC’s argu-
ment here, and at every stage of argument at 
both levels of court, was simply that the IOC 
alone had the power to set Olympic events.
#e issues of Charter application were can-
vassed at most length in the trial judgment of 
the British Columbia Supreme Court. Madam 
Justice Fenlon rejected the plainti's’ contention 
that VANOC was subject to “routine or regular” 
control by government.35 #is was despite the 
following facts:
1. the governments collectively36 appoint a 
majority of the members of the Board of 
Directors, at pleasure (not $xed terms), 
and can also name special appointees to 
the Board;
2. the governments have a series of rights 
to $nancial and business information 
and approvals;
3. the governments make signi$cant di-
rect and indirect $nancial contribu-
tions to the Games’ budget;
4. VANOC is prohibited from amending 
its bylaws or essential governing struc-
ture without consent of all governments;
5. VANOC’s original by-laws and letters 
patent are subject to approval of three 
of the governments;
6. VANOC is $scally accountable to 
government.
Instead, the court stated that VANOC was sub-
ject to the “routine and regular” or “day-to-day” 
control of the IOC, a private, Swiss non-govern-
mental entity.37 
Madam Justice Fenlon continued nonethe-
less, stating that “hosting the 2010 Games is 
uniquely governmental in nature.”38 #e Olym-
pic Games are awarded not to a private entity 
but to the host governments: only a government 
can bid for and host Olympic Games.39 #e IOC, 
while it owns the Games, does not actually stage 
them. #e result, Justice Fenlon concluded, was 
that “VANOC is subject to the Charter when it 
carries out the activity of planning, organizing, 
$nancing, and staging the 2010 Olympics.”40 
#us, the Charter is applicable as an extension 
of the second line of argument, initially elabo-
rated in Eldridge.41
However, despite her earlier conclusion that 
the Charter applied to VANOC as it delivered 
the Olympics, Justice Fenlon found that section 
15 could not apply to the exclusion of women 
ski jumpers from the Olympics. A breach of 
section 15 cannot be found for decisions that 
VANOC cannot control: “only those activities 
and the decisions that VANOC has the ability 
to make while delivering those activities can be 
the source of a breach of the Charter.”42 VANOC 
did not, the court asserted, exercise any of its 
decision-making power in delivering the 2010 
Games in breach of section 15. In short, the ap-
plication issue reemerges, this time as spoiler of 
the section 15 claim.
Like a piece of Swiss cheese, the activity of 
delivering the Olympics has holes in it. VANOC, 
staging a government programme with a dis-
criminatory element, gets to say it is merely act-
ing on the orders of the IOC and is therefore 
immune to section 15 obligations. #e govern-
ment activity named in the application discus-
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sion turns out not to include the selection of 
competitive events — only the staging of those 
events.43 #e result allows government to carry 
out or assign a programme with any number of 
explicitly discriminatory events, provided that 
the control over the decision to discriminate is 
contractually le% with some entity other than 
the government or the stager of the event. #is 
e'ectively folds the “ascribed government ac-
tivity” test back into the government control 
test, albeit at the section 15 stage, and the slice 
of government activity is now more holes than 
cheese.
Reasoning at the Court of Appeal followed 
this result but by a di'erent route. #e Court of 
Appeal began its section 32 analysis from the 
position that VANOC is a private entity con-
trolled by another private entity, the IOC: “no 
government has legal power to control VANOC 
even if government wished to do so.”44 #e 
court goes on to say that even if the hosting 
of the Games could be construed as a matter 
within the authority of the government under 
section 32 of the Charter (and thus a govern-
mental programme), the selection of the events 
at the Games could not. #is is because the IOC 
has the exclusive authority to set those events. 
Moreover, the government contracted for the 
Olympics before the events had been set, indi-
cating that “it is clear that the speci$c events 
to be staged were not important to the goals of 
government.”45 #is is unpersuasive. Govern-
ments may have been agnostic as to what events 
are scheduled generally. But surely they should 
be assumed to have as at least an implicit goal 
that constitutional standards are observed in 
any programme in which they participate. 
At the Court of Appeal, the Charter applica-
tion focus is narrowed to the decision to exclude 
the women. #e broader context is irrelevant 
and the question of whether the staging of the 
Games is otherwise subject to the Charter is le% 
open. #us the claim fails at the Charter appli-
cation stage: there is no government actor nor 
government activity involved in the exclusion of 
the women ski jumpers. #e import is the same 
as at the lower court: leave decision-making 
responsibility for some element of a (possible) 
government programme with some other pri-
vate player and that decision — no matter how 
odious — is Charter immune. 
#e British Columbia Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeal both ignored that the IOC’s 
decision to exclude the women is implemented 
and realized by VANOC’s staging of the Games. 
VANOC must take a myriad of small and large 
actions to ensure that the men can compete: 
construction of the ski jumps, transportation 
to Vancouver and to the competitions, provi-
sion of housing in Vancouver, provision of ath-
letes’ seats at the Opening Ceremonies, con-
ducting medal ceremonies with medals, and so 
on.46 VANOC excluded the women from each 
of these activities and the men’s exclusive par-
ticipation is made possible only by these ac-
tivities. Pointedly, in practice, there is no clear 
and sharp line between the IOC’s decision and 
VANOC’s implementation of it.47 
Contractual obligations ought not to negate 
VANOC’s duty to refuse to implement a dis-
criminatory decision if the law, here the Con-
stitution, requires such a refusal. To say that 
VANOC had no control over the question, and 
therefore no constitutional obligation, is to re-
verse the proper order of analysis and to allow 
contract to trump constitution. It was a variant 
of this concern that led the Supreme Court of 
Canada to elaborate an alternative course to 
Charter applicability in the Eldridge decision: 
“Just as governments are not permitted to es-
cape Charter scrutiny by entering into com-
mercial contracts or other ‘private’ arrange-
ments, they should not be allowed to evade their 
constitutional responsibilities by delegating the 
implementation of their policies and programs 
to private entities.”48 Otherwise, governments 
can simply privatize their way out of Charter 
compliance.
#e Court of Appeal, despite its section 32 
conclusion, also considered the section 15 aspect 
of the case, if merely to recycle its initial argu-
ments about control. Here the court narrowed 
the guarantee of equality pro'ered by section 
15 to a guarantee that applies only to “the way 
that the law a'ects individuals.”49 Relying on 
the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Au-
ton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General)50, the court argued that the 
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ski jumpers must show that the unequal ben-
e$t (the availability of men’s but not women’s 
ski jumping events) is “in some way a product 
of ‘law’.”51 #is, the Court stated, is a threshold 
requirement for section 15 breaches.52 And be-
cause the decision to exclude the women does 
not stem from statutory authority (or from any 
other power )owing from the Crown) there was 
no “law” involved to trigger section 15 analy-
sis.53 Moreover, even if the Multiparty Agree-
ment or the Host City Contract (the two con-
tracts “assigning” the Olympics to Vancouver) 
quali$ed as law,54 the policy that is the subject of 
the ski jumpers’ complaint lay within the exclu-
sive authority of the IOC, not those contractual 
documents.55 #e issue under section 15, for 
the Court of Appeal like the trial court, then, 
was control — more speci$cally, VANOC’s 
lack of control over the choice of events at the 
Olympics.
#is is an unconvincing argument. It makes 
little sense to restrict section 15 to a narrower 
ambit than other Charter rights and to exclude 
actions otherwise caught by section 32.56 #e 
argument immunizes signi$cant ranges of the 
modern administrative state’s allocation of re-
sources and powers. And this argument also 
e'ectively allows government to contract out 
of equality rights responsibility for elements of 
programmes for which it is otherwise account-
able under the Charter. Too thin a parsing of 
government action that is accountable under 
section 15 adds yet another mogul to the run 
for equality litigants.
Discrimination Against the Women 
Ski Jumpers
While the issue of discrimination was not 
the legal fulcrum on which these judgments 
turned, it was, a%er all, the whole point of the 
case. Some observations consequently are war-
ranted. #is case is just one moment in the his-
tory of women in ski jumping but it encapsu-
lates the larger and long-standing gender issues 
of the sport. Commentators have noted that the 
sport of ski jumping, in particular, “o'ers an il-
luminating discourse in gender stereotypes and 
expectations.”57 Organized sport in general both 
constructs and enforces historical myths about 
women’s physical inferiority.58 Ski jumping of-
fers a particularly compelling illustration, as it 
is a sport from which women have until quite 
recently been excluded, yet it is also a sport in 
which women’s abilities are roughly compara-
ble to men’s.59 #us, tensions around women’s 
exclusion and the threats their inclusion rep-
resents to the gendered texture of the sport are 
easier to read.60 Certainly, despite women’s per-
formance as jumpers, gender stereotypes about 
women and the sport persist. Only a few years 
ago, Gian Franco Kasper, at the time head of the 
International Ski Federation, opined to the me-
dia about ski jumping for women: “Don’t forget, 
it’s like jumping down from, let’s say, about two 
meters on the ground about a thousand times 
a year, which seems not to be appropriate for 
ladies from a medical point of view.”61 Appar-
ently, exploding uteri threaten.62
Consequently, the equality issue in this case 
is, as equality issues go, an easy one. It is simple, 
formal equality that is at stake. #e much-ma-
ligned “similarly situated” test does just $ne as 
a vehicle for showing up the discrimination at 
issue here. As a number of commentators have 
already noted, rights claims that require sig-
ni$cant redistribution or state expenditures tax 
our courts.63 Claims where the female equal-
ity litigants are much the same as comparable 
men “but for” their gender are the most sec-
tion 15 friendly.64 In the Sagen case, the jumps 
were already built. No subtle understandings of 
gendered nuance or complications of the social 
manifestations of sex di'erence are needed. #e 
women jump as well, sometimes better, than the 
men and the evidence is clear that it is only their 
gender that holds them back.
#is case is also not unique, nor is the dis-
crimination newly noted. Sex discrimination 
challenges to sporting facilities and organiza-
tions abound. One of the $rst section 15 gender 
discrimination cases involved a successful chal-
lenge by a twelve year old girl, Justine Blain-
ey, who wished to play in a boys-only hockey 
league.65 Since Blainey, every year or two it 
seems, a sex discrimination challenge based on 
exclusion from full bene$ts of some organized 
sport surfaces, although typically these cases 
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are brought under statutory human rights law 
and not the Charter.66 While the ski jumpers 
were considering their legal action at least two 
other sport sex discrimination complaints were 
in the news.67
Madam Justice Fenlon’s conclusion on the 
question of di'erent treatment was stark: “the 
exclusion of women’s ski jumping from the 2010 
Games is discriminatory…. [T]he plainti's will 
be denied this opportunity for no reason other 
than their sex.”68 Her reasoning was straight-
forward. Neither the male nor the female ski 
jumpers met the requisite degree of “univer-
sality” required by the IOC’s formal criteria 
for event inclusion. 69 Both fail by roughly the 
same amount (taking into account the di'eren-
tial rates the criteria set for men and women), 
yet the men got to jump by virtue of their his-
toric involvement in the “Olympic tradition.”70 
And the “Olympic tradition” by which the men 
bene$t incorporates and is shaped by historic 
stereotyping and prejudice against women ath-
letes — women ski jumpers in particular. #e 
“grandfathering” of the men into the Olympics 
“perpetuates the e'ect of that prejudice and is, 
therefore, discriminatory.”71 #e only problem 
for the ski jumpers’ case was that the discrimi-
nation was done by the IOC, not VANOC.
#e IOC escaped lightly. #e British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court took at face value the 
IOC’s many expressions of good will towards 
gender equity. #e court gave only slight weight 
to expert $ndings of extensive discrimina-
tion against women in the ski jumping move-
ment and in sport generally, and the impact 
of this discrimination on the IOC’s decision.72 
#e women had argued that historic prejudice 
against women in ski jumping meant that, even 
though the IOC’s criteria determining the re-
quired degree of universality for a sport to be 
included in the Olympics set a lower threshold 
for women than for men, the criteria for wom-
en were discriminatory.73 Historic prejudice 
had acted as “societal headwinds” preventing 
women from reaching technical merit require-
ments.74 #e ski jumpers gave evidence about 
lower levels of funding, support, and training 
opportunities than their male counterparts, 
making the achievement of a world-class level 
very di-cult, if not impossible.75 Inclusion in 
the Olympics was cited as a key and necessary 
mechanism for the growth and expansion of the 
sport.76 #e court rejected these broader argu-
ments, arguing that discrimination )owed only 
from the application of the “Olympic tradition 
exemption” to the men’s ski jumping.77
Outside of the courts, more realistic and 
less naive understandings hold sway. Observing 
that other events newly scheduled for the 2010 
Games — notably women’s ski cross78 — also 
fall signi$cantly below the universality thresh-
old for inclusion that the IOC claims it applies, 
some argue that: “What matters to the IOC is: 
Will the event sell tickets, will it sell TV time, 
is it popular?”79 Partner this observation with 
the following comment by Dick Pound, a long-
time Canadian IOC o-cial, about future IOC 
treatment of the ski jumpers, and the IOC’s in-
sistence that the decision was based “purely on 
technical merit”80 becomes increasingly suspect:
But if in the meantime, you’re making all kinds 
of allegations about the IOC and how it’s dis-
criminating on the basis of gender and so on 
then the IOC, in a very human reaction, might 
say, “Oh yeah, I remember them. #ey’re the 
ones that embarrassed us and caused us a lot of 
trouble in Vancouver. Maybe they should wait 
another four years or eight years or whatever 
it may be.”81
Only 17 per cent of the IOC members are wom-
en and only one woman sits on the IOC execu-
tive.82 #e evidence suggests that the commer-
cial imperatives of a private corporation that 
owns the rights to a very expensive sporting 
event — as well as personal grudges or biases  
— can signi$cantly and unfairly in)uence se-
lection of new competitive Olympic events.
!e “Outrun:”83 Re"ections on the 
Challenge 
#e decisions by the two courts were not 
particularly popular. Editorials in the local pa-
pers supported the women84 and a recent poll 
showed that 73 per cent of Canadians were in 
favour of including women ski jumpers in the 
Olympics.85 A comment by Lindsay Van, one 
of the defeated ski jumpers, sums up one par-
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ticular sentiment: “#e Canadian court sys-
tem is a little bit weak if it can’t stand up to the 
IOC and apply Canadian law.”86 Even the trial 
judge found “something distasteful”87 about the 
outcome.
Certainly, one could argue for an improved 
theory of Charter applicability. Both academ-
ics and judges have articulated more functional 
tests for designating an entity or activity as gov-
ernmental that better $t the landscape of con-
temporary Canadian society.88 But such doc-
trinal $nessing is not the main mission of this 
comment. Rather, the purpose is to show how 
even a fairly simple claim of sex discrimina-
tion can founder when forced to seek resolution 
through Charter litigation. 
Law can variously moderate, con$rm, or 
challenge power.89 Charter law, in particular, has 
been touted as establishing a set of guarantees 
that moves us towards a better and fairer soci-
ety. But as we have seen in Sagen, the distinc-
tions at play in Charter argument can instead 
“provide formal paraphernalia behind which 
private power thrives relatively unchecked and 
substantive issues are arbitrarily and unjustly 
resolved.”90 More speci$cally, the private power 
of both the IOC and VANOC as the two corpo-
rations roll out a large public event — at consid-
erable public inconvenience and expense, with 
broad government involvement — is rendered 
unproblematic. VANOC’s complicity in IOC 
treatment of the women is excused, even legiti-
mated. #e exclusion of the women ski jump-
ers, even though condemned by the lower court 
judge, is le% intact. Governments, the IOC, and 
VANOC, a%er expressions of concern for the 
“girls,” quickly move on.91 #e Charter case, 
it seems, simply reinforces the power of the 
Olympics corporations to treat women however 
they see $t.
To return to the earlier point that the draw-
ing of any line between the public and the pri-
vate is inevitably political, what was at stake in 
this case? How can we understand the courts’ 
refusal to draw the line so that VANOC and the 
exclusion of the women ski jumpers lie within 
the reach of the Charter and its equality rights? 
Certainly, VANOC occupies a hazy middle 
ground between formal government and its 
legislative acts, and other entities now clearly 
doctrinally accepted as private. Would holding 
VANOC subject to the Charter threaten the col-
lapse of these older distinctions? Perhaps. Any-
time a new and challenging factual scenario 
forces a recalibration of the line, there is the risk 
that the indeterminancy of the whole public/
private edi$ce will be clearly revealed. If this 
corporation (VANOC) or this programme (the 
Olympics) is considered governmental, then 
who knows what corporation is within range of 
the Charter’s strictures?
But maybe it is also important that this 
case is about sport, and about women in sport. 
Imagine if the exclusion had been of some other 
group, say black or Jewish participants, and if 
the event had been some other form of inter-
national meeting hosted by our governments. 
Would the courts have been as hands-o' in 
such a case? Would the governments and local 
organizers been as quick to defer to an extra-
national decision maker?
Much has been written about sport as trans-
mitter of social and cultural values, its replica-
tion of hierarchical, racist, militaristic, and pa-
triarchal social structures, and its centrality to 
Western society.92 A history of exclusion and 
discrimination (of many sorts) marks national 
and international sports organizations. “#e 
history of modern sport is a history of cultural 
struggle.”93 But it o%en takes clever and persis-
tent social archaeology to reveal how this histo-
ry persists and shapes what we consider normal 
and natural about sport, and how sport plays 
such a powerful and structural role in our so-
cieties. Perhaps the ski jumpers’ application of 
the Charter to the Olympics ran afoul of deeply 
entrenched ideas about sport — of dominant 
assumptions about sport as essentially private 
and individual, not a public institution. #at 
Canadian human rights law had a tradition 
(now defunct) of allowing sex discrimination 
in sports speaks to long-standing assumptions 
about, among other things, the preferability of 
private ordering in sports and its organization.94 
It may also be that sport just seems too trivial to 
engage the full force of constitutional law; it is 
okay, that is, to leave it to its own devices, even if 
a few women su'er some missed competitions.
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So, at the end of the day, what can one say 
about this case? Certainly, it is a shame that the 
women are shut out. #eir exclusion has impli-
cations for the development of their sport, as 
funding — both governmental and sponsorship 
— so o%en is dependant upon Olympic eligibil-
ity. But there are other observations more spe-
ci$c to the sport of Charter litigation as it plays 
out in the Canadian polity. Charter litigation 
has contingent and unpredictable signi$cance. 
In addition to its containment of the struggles 
of subordinate groups and its legitimation of 
that subordination, it can on occasion catalyze 
broader political support for those struggles. It 
is also possible that, despite what Dick Pound 
says, the public black eye the case gave the IOC 
will make a positive di'erence to the fate of the 
women ski jumpers at the 2014 Olympics. Al-
ready, movement on the issue is discernable. 
#e Governor General of Canada, Michaëlle 
Jean, reports lobbying IOC President Jacques 
Rogge at the opening ceremony of the 2010 
Olympics for inclusion of women’s ski jumping 
at the next Winter Olympics. Rogge is reported 
by her to have commented favourably on the 
women’s chances.95 (Although in the wake of 
the 2010 Olympics and the domination of wom-
en’s hockey by the Canadian and American 
teams, Rogge waded into gendered controversy 
again by hinting that women’s hockey may soon 
be on the chopping block.96 ) #e story contin-
ues, with a new )ight of ski jumpers to carry 
the cause and another chapter in women’s ski 
jumping to be written. But the Charter has once 
again proven resilient to attempts to use it to 
obtain gender justice. #e orchestration of the 
2010 Olympics was the wrong playing $eld for 
Charter claims, and women ski jumpers con-
tinue to be consigned to the bleachers and kept 
from the podium.
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